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Abstract 
This paper contends that, despite evidences, Aristotle’s view of aristocratic 
constitutions displays a heavily marked normative content. I argue that his 
understanding of aristocracy may be separated into four main strands: (i) an ideal 
type, based on the rotation of power of virtuous people over equally virtuous 
citizens (as evinced from a joint reading of Books III and IV); (ii) a type grounded 
on a fine blending of social classes, as emerging from a reading of Pol. IV, 
7.1293b7-18 in the light of Politics IV,3.1290a24-29; (iii) a polity inclining 
toward oligarchy, which seems to lack any normative worth; (iv) an ‘aristocratic 
polity’, grounded on the political role of the middle class (Book IV.11). I shall 
propose that, in non-ideal conditions, type (iv) is the constitution which best 
accommodates (a) the need for stability and concord, (b) the search for an ideal of 
structural harmony and proportion among rulers and citizens. 
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1. Introduction 
Aristotle’s treatment of aristocracy stands out in the taxonomy of 
constitutions outlined in the Politics as remarkably more elusive than his 
discussion of other forms of government. While in books III-VI the 
philosopher spends considerable time and effort in presenting a systematic 
account of different kinds of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy, he does 
not seem offer an equally wide-ranging picture of the rule by the excellent. 
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Also, his references to aristocracy appear scattered throughout the text and 
do not seem to point to an exclusive qualifying criterion shared by any 
kind of aristocracy. For instance, he occasionally speaks of some forms of 
aristocracy whose core value is public concern for ethical excellence1, 
whereas, on other occasions, he mentions forms of government which, 
although generally labeled as “aristocratic”, show a well-articulated 
plurality of values, including wealth, good birth (εὐγένεια), education 
(παιδεία)2 and sometimes even specific modalities of popular 
participation3. Such constitutions will vary from each other depending on 
the chosen combination of eligibility criteria and on the priorities accorded 
to each. Within such forms of government, then, ethical excellence 
appears simply as one, and not as the only distinctive feature of 
aristocracy. 
This paper contends that Aristotle’s concern is addressed to the 
normative – rather than to the merely descriptive and taxonomic - aspect 
of the aristocratic form of government, and proposes that different levels of 
normativity are at work in Aristotle’s treatment of aristocracy. I begin by 
examining Politics IV, 7, where three different kinds of constitutional 
forms are sketched out and presented as properly aristocratic: (i) a regime 
made up of those who are best simply on the basis of virtue (Pol. IV, 
                                                 
*  I would like to address special thanks to Dr. Federico Zuolo for his useful and 
constructive comments on this paper. 
1  See Pol. III, 7.1279a35-37; 13.1283b20-21; 15.1286b3-5; IV, 7.1293b1-5; 
8.1293b40.  
2  See Pol. III, 12.1283a9-22; IV, 3.1289b40-1290a2; 8.1293b35-38; 8.1294a19-25. See 
also IV, 4.1291b27-30, where Aristotle mentions the notables (οἱ γνώριμοι), who 
generally hold the highest offices in aristocracies, by pointing out that there are kinds 
distinguished by wealth, good birth, virtue, and education. On the plurality of requisites 
see WHIBLEY 1968, 111-112; cf. ARNHEIM 1977.   
3  See for instance Aristotle’s treatment of Sparta, Crete and Carthage in Book II of the 
Politics (sections 9-12). Cf.  Pol. IV, 7.1293b7-18. 
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7.1293b1-7); (ii) regimes differing from both oligarchy and polity, which 
Aristotle exemplifies by mentioning Sparta and Carthage (Pol. IV, 
7.1293b7-18), and (iii) those forms of so-called polity which incline more 
toward oligarchy (Pol. IV, 7.1293b18-21). I propose that only two among 
the three constitutional types outlined at Politics IV.7 possess a normative 
side: the first one, which conveys the idea of a perfect virtue-based 
aristocracy, and the second one, where such an excellence coexists with 
and informs other criteria for political power. 
In the second part of this paper I note that a crucial form of government 
of aristocratic flavour appears to be left out of the picture: a polity which 
does not incline either toward oligarchy or toward democracy, but is 
rather grounded in the presence and stabilizing role of the middle-class. 
This kind of polity, which Aristotle invites the reader to identify as a sort 
of aristocracy, is introduced at Politics IV.11 and presented as the best 
regime for most cities, championing a way of life that does not fall outside 
the intellectual and ethical range of most citizens and that, just for this 
reason, makes it possible for them to participate in the running of the 
polis. I argue that this is a fourth kind of aristocracy, which is not included 
in Politics IV.7 and discloses a normative factor different from those 
exhibited by the forms of aristocracy outlined in the above mentioned 
section. What approximates it to the level of a well-blended aristocracy is 
the degree of beauty employed in the blending of its political components. 
I shall tease out the various normative aspects of aristocracy through 
two methodological patterns of political analysis that Aristotle himself 
makes available to the reader. The first paradigm, traceable at Politics 
IV.1, lays down the main tasks of political science and prescribes to study 
(i) the ideal constitution; (ii) which regime is fitting for which cities; (iii) 
the regime based on a presupposition; (iv) the regime which is most fitting 
for all cities. The second, which we find enucleated in a short passage of 
Politics IV.3 (1290a24-29), proposes a classification of constitutions 
based on the distinction between one or two regimes that are beautifully 
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constituted and their deviations, which are described as “deviations from 
the well-blended harmony as well as from the best regime”. I suggest that 
the “polity of aristocratic flavour” introduced at Politics IV.11 can be 
better understood in its nature and goals in the light of the first pattern of 
analysis, whereas the aristocracies exemplified by Sparta and Carthage at 
Politics IV.7 find conceptual support in the second paradigm.  
 
2. The First Kind of Aristocracy as the Best Constitution in Absolute 
In section 7 of Book IV of the Politics Aristotle lists three kinds and, 
on the whole, four different examples of aristocratic government. As for 
the first one, by referring to unspecified arguments which have already 
been laid out in the text, he speaks of a constitution made up by those who 
are ἄριστοι in virtue conceived in absolute terms:  
 
Now it is right to call aristocracy [the regime] we treated in our first discourses. 
Only the regime that is made up of those who are best in absolute4 on the basis of 
virtue, and not of men who are good in relation to some presupposition, is justly 
referred to as an aristocracy; for only here is it simply the case that the same 
person is a good man and a good citizen, while those who are good in others are so 
in relation to their regime (Pol. IV, 7.1293b1-7). 
 
The above mentioned passage presents some interpretive problems. In 
the first place, although the qualifying trait of this first type of aristocracy 
is undoubtedly pure virtue, it is not entirely clear whether such a 
constitutional pattern is traceable in existing historical cities or it rather 
indicates the ideal constitution. Secondly, in case the aristocracy at issue 
                                                 
4  The English translation of the Politics I adopt in this paper is LORD 1984. Here, 
however, I have modified Lord’s translation of the Greek ἁπλῶς as “simply”, given that 
in the following lines he opposes those who possess virtue ἁπλῶς to those who possess it 
relatively to some presupposition. The adverb “simply” would rather emphasize the 
distinction between the first kind of aristocracy, which is the one grounded on pure 
virtue, and the remaining two kinds, which include other criteria of political power. 
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were the ideal one, it might be wondered whether absolute excellence in 
such a regime is an exclusive prerogative of rulers. 
Aristotle speaks of the first kind of aristocracy in very generic terms, 
which makes it hard to find an uncontroversial solution to the above 
mentioned interpretive issues. His appeal to what he calls “the first 
discourses” might represent the key to our understanding of this first kind 
of aristocracy. Some scholars maintain that, by invoking the “first 
discourses”, Aristotle is referring the reader to Books VII-VIII, where he 
spends a great deal of effort to lay the grounds for the best possible 
constitution. Their view implies that the original position of these books in 
the text was antecedent to book IV5. An alternative possibility is stressed 
by Barker, who claims that the philosopher expressly addresses some 
remarks contained in Book III, particularly those concerning his well-
known distinction between the good man and the good citizen and the 
subsequent identification of the virtue of the good man as the one 
possessed by the good ruler in absolute6. 
On my view, it is primarily to Book III that Aristotle is referring in his 
account of the best form of aristocracy outlined in Book IV. Remarkably 
enough, in the last section of Book III (Pol. III, 18.1288a37-39), he 
makes use of the same expression, i.e. “the first discourses”, by pointing 
out not only that the main object of concern is the relationship between the 
virtue of the good man and that of the good citizen in the best city, but 
also and especially that the two virtues are one and the same, just as it is 
reported in Pol. IV, 7. 1293b3-5 with respect to the first kind of 
aristocracy. Nor is it a case that, in Book III, the picture of the ideal 
constitution makes a significant appearance as the framework of discussion 
                                                 
5  See for instance NEWMAN 1887-1902; SUSEMIHL-HICKS 1894; WELLDON 1883. See 
also SIMPSON 1998, xvi-xvii. The same view is held by Lord, although his edition of the 
Politics retains the “traditional” order (see in particular 257, footnote 29).  
6  See BARKER 1946, 186-187. For a better understanding of his stance see III, 4, 
particularly 1277a14-16 and 1277b25-30. 
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chosen by Aristotle do set up the identity between the authentically 
virtuous man and the good ruler in absolute7. Assuming that it is primarily 
Book III that Aristotle has in mind while outlining the first kind of 
aristocracy in book IV, how can it help us to understand its nature and the 
implications of the identity between the good man and the good citizen 
established at VI.7? A plausible answer can be found in the emphasis 
accorded in Book III on the relationship between the distinctive virtue of 
the good citizen and that of the good ruler. The core of their distinction 
lies in the idea that, unlike the good citizen, whose distinctive virtue and 
political commitment simply presupposes an unquestioning abidance by 
the constitutional principles in force in his community, the good ruler is 
fully equipped with wisdom and a deliberative capacity informed by 
ethical excellence8. On the other hand, in the ideal city, which Aristotle 
selects as a suitable frame for his discussion9, the two virtues can be 
conceptually distinct without this preventing an individual from possessing 
both10.  
                                                 
7  See Pol. III, 4. 1276b35-37: «By raising questions in a different manner, the same 
argument [i.e. the issue of the virtue of the good citizen and its relation to that of the good 
man] can be made concerning the best regime». 
8  See Pol. III, 4. 1276b28- 1277a20. Among those who emphasise a structural difference 
between the two virtues we find Develin (1973), who argues that the excellence of the 
ruler and the excellence of the ruled cannot coincide, not even within the framework of 
the ideal polis, whose well-being mainly depends on a well balanced diversification of 
functions. A similar view with regard to Book III is held by KRAUT 2002, 364-368), 
although he maintains that in Books VII-VIII the ideal city is described as one in which 
all citizens possess a correct understanding of well-being and have the equipment needed 
to live an ethically virtuous life (186, 359-360). 
9  See footnote 7 above.  
10  I refer the reader to IRRERA 2012, where the “coexistence thesis” is expounded, that is, 
the view that the virtue of the good citizen in the ideal city is perfectly compatible with a 
simultaneous possession of ethical and intellectual excellence. In other words, each and 
every citizen of the ideal city would be a potentially good ruler.  
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As he stresses at Pol. III, 4.1277b11-13, learning how to become a 
good citizen is an indispensable step towards becoming a good ruler, just 
as it happens in the military sphere, where one learns to be a commander 
of cavalry by serving under other commanders11. Even more forcefully, at 
Pol. III, 13.1283b42-1284 a2 he claims that citizens should also be able 
to rule:  
 
A citizen in the common sense is one who shares in ruling and being ruled; but 
he differs in accordance with each regime. In the case of the best regime, he is one 
who is capable of and intentionally chooses being ruled and ruling12 with a view to 
the life in accordance with virtue13.  
 
Although no political community – not even the ideal one - can allow a 
simultaneous exercise of political power on its members’ part, there seems 
to be a possible way of guaranteeing political participation to all: 
government in relays (ἐν μέρει). As Aristotle makes it clear in the context 
of an investigation of the ideal constitution, such a political device is 
needed among persons who are free and equal in nature, for all cannot rule 
at the same time but each rules for a given period of time, so that, as a 
result, all have a share in ruling activity (Pol. II, 2.1261a31-b9)14. In fact, 
such a method of allocation of political honours and duties is an 
appropriate normative response to the following principle: equal men 
should have what is fine (καλόν) and just (δίκαιον) in relays, and to assign 
things unequal to similar individuals is contrary to nature, not to consider 
that nothing contrary to nature is fine (Pol. VII, 3.1325b7-10). 
                                                 
11  «But there is also a sort of rule in accordance with which one rules those who are similar 
in stock and free. For this is what we speak of as political rule, and the ruler learns it by 
being ruled – just as the cavalry commander learns by being commanded, the general by 
being led, and  [similarly in the case of] the leader of a regiment or a company».  
12  Cf. Plato, Laws I, 643e. 
13  A similar position is held at Pol. III, 4.1277a25-27. 
14  On the issue of government in relays see CAMBIANO 2000. Cf. IRRERA 2012, 145-146. 
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The view that the good citizen of an ideal polis can also be a good ruler 
is theoretically sustained by the identity established by Aristotle between 
the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man in the ideal 
community. Such a view, vaguely foreshadowed at Pol. III, 415, finds its 
full expression at Pol. III, 18.1288a36-39. Provided that φρόνησις is the 
distinctive excellence of the good man16, the virtue of the good citizen, 
being the same as that of the good man, will not consist in mere 
conformity to the constitution in force, but will display itself in an exercise 
of autonomous deliberative excellence. It is just the latter excellence 
which entitles a good citizen to hold the highest political offices. 
If equality is the underlying ratio of any form of government in relays, 
in the ideal constitution it will then take the form of equality based on 
virtue, provided that, in accordance with the leading principles of the best 
regime, each and every individual committed to ruling activity is expected 
to possess and display authentic φρόνησις 17. On my view, this explains 
Aristotle’s thought that, although the virtue of the good citizen is not the 
same as the virtue of the good ruler, the virtue of a citizen of reputation is 
held to be the capacity to rule and be ruled finely 
(δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεινκαὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς) (Pol. III, 4. 1277a25-27). Full 
excellence and deliberative capacity will be required in the ideal 
community even of those who, at a given time, play the role of “simple” 
citizens18; for there will come a time for them to have a share in the 
highest offices. 
                                                 
15  At Pol. III, 4.1277a14-16 Aristotle asserts that φρόνησις is the distinctive excellence of 
the good ruler, not of the good citizen. At Pol. III, 4.1277a20-21, however, he identifies 
the virtue of the good citizen with that of the good man by presenting it as a hypothesis. 
If we accept its validity, φρόνησις will be possessed by the good citizen as well. 
16  See Pol. III, 4.1277a14-16, mentioned above. 
17  See Pol. III, 4. 1277a14-16, 1277b25-26. 
18  Cf. SIMPSON 1998, 191, 316. 
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We might now wonder in what respects reference to the “first 
discourses” contributes to clarifying the nature of the “aristocracy of the 
best people”. This kind of aristocracy, which he presents in terms of “the 
best regime” (τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, Pol. IV, 7.1293b18-19), is not 
simply “the best aristocracy” among the three listed at Pol. IV, 7, but the 
best constitution in absolute. It is just this sort of constitution that acts as 
supreme regulative ideal for politicians and political scientists. In this 
respect, it seems to be endowed with a high normative worth, which 
explicates itself in the capacity to show what each and every virtuous 
citizen should be: a potentially good ruler. This suggests that aristocracy, 
being by definition government of the ἄριστοι directed to the promotion of 
the common interest19, is not necessarily modeled on the pattern of an 
asymmetrical relation in terms of virtue between rulers and ruled, as it 
might otherwise happen in particular cases of historical constitutions20. 
As Aristotle says at Pol. IV, 2.1289a31-32, to speak of the ideal polis 
is tantamount to speaking of aristocracy (plausibly the first aristocratic 
kind outlined in Pol. IV, 7). By relating the best constitution in absolute 
to a specific form of government, aristocracy, he gives a well-defined 
content to a purely abstract political category. What emerges from his 
reference to the “first speeches” in Pol. IV, 7 is not the willingness to 
detach the first aristocracy from the historically existing ones, but to 
specify and give substance to an abstract ideal, one which would 
otherwise risk to be the object of a sterile, utopian speculation.  
     
3. Aristocracy as a Well-tempered Constitution 
If reference to the “first discourses” made in Pol. IV, 7 has helped us 
to understand how the first aristocracy is to be conceived, it nevertheless 
does not explain the relationship subsisting between this first kind of 
                                                 
19  See Pol. III, 7. 1279a35-37. 
20  On the Aristocracy based on the superiority of rulers see for instance Pol. III, 4 1288a9-
15 and Pol. III, 18.1288a32-39. 
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aristocracy and the following two. Unlike the former, presented as a 
constitution based on possession and exercise of pure virtue, the latter 
kinds seem to involve a combination of qualities and selection criteria 
needed to perform a leading role in politics. We might wonder, then, 
whether such constitutions relate to the best one, and in what respects 
they depart from it. I propose that a suitable theoretical backup for the task 
is supplied by Aristotle in Pol. IV, 3. Here, by analysing some possible 
reasons for the existence of a plurality of constitutions, he explains that the 
constitution is an arrangement of offices (ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις) whose 
distribution takes place with respect to the political weight (δύναμις) of 
those sharing in the constitution; constitutions are therefore as many as the 
ways of arranging magistracies in relation to the preeminence and the 
difference of the parts (Pol. IV, 3.1290a7-13). At any rate, as Aristotle is 
keen on emphasizing, it seems that the variety of constitutions can be 
reduced in the last analysis to two distinct kinds: democracy and 
oligarchy21. By appealing to what seems to be a commonsensical view, 
aristocracy might be envisaged as a peculiar form of oligarchy, whereas 
the polity as a form of democracy. In the attempt to exemplify this concept 
by way of images understandable by anyone, he proposes not only the 
case of various winds that can be substantially reduced to two kinds, i.e. 
the northern and the southern, but also the case of different musical 
modes, which can be reciprocally combined in various ways. Emphasis on 
combination helps the readers’ understanding of a different way of 
thinking of constitutions. In fact, Aristotle explains that, although his 
contemporaries are generally accustomed to conceive of constitutions in 
this way,  
 
                                                 
21  On the polarity between oligarchy and democracy in Aristotle’s times see MULGAN 
1991, particularly 311.  
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[…] it is truer (ἀληθέστερον) and better (βέλτιον) to distinguish as we have, and 
say that one or two are finely constituted (τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας) and the others 
deviations (παρεκβάσεις) from them – deviations from the well-blended harmony 
(τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας̣) as well as from the best regime, the more taut [of the 
harmonies] being oligarchic and more like rule of a master, the relaxed and soft 
being popular (Pol. IV, 3.1290a24-29). 
 
His taxonomy is an alternative more theoretically sustainable and 
practically efficacious than the commonsensical paradigm. By initially 
exhibiting a substantial degree of uncertainty, Aristotle proposes “one or 
two” constitutions in the light of which the others seem to derive their 
nature as “deviations”. The marking trait of the first two is a construction 
effected “in a beautiful way”. In the case of the ideal constitution, the 
“good construction” stems from the adoption of virtue as the qualifying 
criterion for the exercise of political power alongside devices such as the 
already mentioned government in relays; as we have seen in the already 
mentioned Pol. VII, 3.1325b7-10, the latter is presented as “beautiful” 
and “consistent with nature”. 
Remarkably enough, however, Aristotle invites the reader to look at 
those constitutions which can be regarded as “beautifully structured” even 
when these are not grounded on the promotion of pure virtue. The beauty 
of the regime’s inherent structure, in this second case, seems to come to 
the surface as the outcome and the visible manifestation of a good 
blending. This implies the existence of different qualifying criteria and 
social groups that do not necessarily share by their own nature a 
prominent concern for the valorization of virtue in political life; 
nevertheless, they result liable to be combined with the featuring qualities 
of different regimes thanks to the intervention of a wise lawgiver. In that 
case, the characteristic beauty of this second kind of constitution would 
not lie in any of its constitutive components, but rather in the blending 
itself. In the light of this taxonomic framework, oligarchies will no longer 
appear as suitable normative paradigms after which aristocracies are 
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modeled. Vice versa, aristocratic forms of government and, in particular, 
the best one, are presented as a suitable cornerstone in the light of which 
oligarchies appear pure deviations. In a similar fashion, democracies are 
just deviations from the well-blended community, which at Pol. IV, 
3.1290a18 is named “polity” (πολιτεία)22. 
As far as the polity is concerned, Aristotle has not yet provided a 
systematic treatment of such a constitutional form, nor has he mentioned 
the wide variety of forms this can take on. In the third book of the Politics, 
for instance, he simply includes it within the group of the right 
constitutions, that is, those regimes which aim at the common interest23, 
and confines himself to presenting it as the rule by a multitude (πλῆθος) of 
people who do not possess virtue as a whole, but just some part of it, like 
the military class, whose distinctive virtue is simply of military kind24. 
Elsewhere, it is presented as a mixture of two constitutions, namely 
oligarchy and democracy (8.1293b33-34: μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ 
δημοκρατίας) or, better said, a mixture of the well off and the poor (μίξις 
τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων; 9.1294a16-17)25. The aspect of polity 
which strengthens the rationale of Aristotle’s argument in Pol. IV, 3 (and 
makes it different from an unspecified “mixture” of various constitutions) 
is the presence of a “virtuous arrangement” of offices and groups. This is 
suggested by the idea that the blending is made “beautifully”, that is, 
according to some kind of proportionality which ensures not only the 
inherent harmony of the polity, but also its stability. This, in turn, 
                                                 
22  On the identification of the well-blended constitution with a form of polity, see 
Simpson’s comment on the passage. 
23  See Pol. III, 7.1279a37-1279b5.   
24  On the involvement of the military class in the administration of the polity I refer the 
reader to IRRERA 2010, section V.  
25  Cf. Pol. IV, 8. 1294a23-24, where Aristotle draws a stark distinction between polity and 
aristocracy by specifying that only aristocracy mixes virtue to wealth and freedom, 
whereas polity is rooted exclusively on the mixture of the two latter properties. 
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presupposes the presence of a wise project, that is, one which involves a 
“phronetic” attitude and possession of the typical deliberative capacity of 
wise lawgivers. What Aristotle mentions as a “polity”, then, is a 
constitution approaching the nature of an aristocracy. 
   If the first kind of constitution enucleated in Pol. IV, 7 corresponds to 
the ideal constitution, the second one seems to incarnate just the kind of 
well-tempered constitution described in Pol. IV, 3. Let us then read the 
passage at Pol. IV, 7.1293b7-18:  
 
Nevertheless, there are certain regimes which differ both from those that are 
oligarchically run and from so-called polity, and are called aristocracies. For 
wherever they elect to offices not only on the basis of wealth but also on the basis 
of desert, the regime itself is different from both of these and is called aristocratic. 
For indeed, in [cities] that do not make virtue a common concern there are still 
certain persons who are of good reputations and held to be respectable. Wherever, 
therefore, the regime looks both to wealth and to virtue as well as the people, as in 
Carthage, it is aristocratic; and so also those which, like the Lacedaemonian 
regime, look to two alone, virtue and the people and where there is a mixture of 
these two things, democracy and virtue.  
 
It is worth noting that, in this second typology of constitution, virtue 
can be employed in the government of a city without being considered as 
the one and only requirement for accessing the highest offices; nor does 
virtue need to be publicly fostered among citizens as a value to cultivate 
and spread. A similar thought seems to reinforce the hypothesis that a 
polity can include respectable and virtuous people in ruling power, even 
though virtue is not regarded by lawgivers a “structural ingredient” of the 
mixture. The relevant examples put forward by Aristotle on this occasion 
are Sparta and Carthage. Within the present framework of discussion, he 
introduces them as cities which exhibit some concern for virtue in ruling 
power. Sparta, for instance, is described as a community whose 
constitutional nature involves a mixture of virtue and popular 
participation, whereas Carthage as one grounded on a mixture of the latter 
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criteria to wealth. Such constitutions, being rooted on a multiplicity of 
presuppositions and qualifying criteria, cannot obviously be regarded as 
forms of a pure aristocracy; nor can they be identified as cases of 
oligarchy, for what oligarchic constitutions make open display of is 
exclusively wealth26, which is championed by those who abide by its 
principles both as a constituent of their personal view of happiness27 and as 
criterion for the selection of people to public offices. Within oligarchic 
forms of government, values like education, nobility of  birth and 
deliberative virtue are not attached a prominent role, and they can emerge 
in and affect political life only in a contingent manner, that is, without 
enjoying public recognition. Sparta and Carthage seem rather closer to a 
blended constitution involving virtue. As far as Carthage is concerned, 
this seems to match the constitutional pattern of aristocracy outlined at 
Pol. IV, 8. 1294a23-25, that is, the one of a well-blended compound of 
wealth, popular participation and virtue. Wealth is instead omitted in the 
case of Sparta, which is described as rooted in a mixture of virtue and 
popular participation. Assuming the reliability of Aristotle’s account of the 
Spartan constitution, such an omission might be explained by a supposed 
willingness of lawgivers to place higher emphasis on values which might 
prove factors of stability in a well-blended mixture. Desire for wealth, by 
contrast, might engender tendencies and attitudes opposed to virtuous 
practice, and it might also be a cause of internal conflict among the 
citizens. 
In this respect, Sparta and Carthage can be identified as normative 
paradigms of a well-tempered constitution. Carthage, in particular, might 
be conceived of as a better aristocratic model than the one exemplified by 
                                                 
26  On the various kinds of oligarchy as regimes based on wealth see Pol. IV, 6.1293a12-
34. See WHIBLEY 1968.   
27  See Book VII, 2.1324a8-10: «Those who ascribe living well to wealth in the case of a 
single person also call the city as a whole blessed if it is wealthy». 
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Sparta, given that, on Aristotle’s account, it adopts virtue as suitable 
criterion of selection not only of the highest offices, but also of lower 
ones, i.e. the which involve a widespread popular participation28. Also, 
by keeping the involvement of the many in political deliberations in high 
esteem, Carthage appears a solid, well organized constitution 
(συντεταγμένης), where people acquiesce in the arrangement of its 
principles and no factional conflict arises between different social groups 
(Pol. II, 11. 1272b29-33). 
In the light of the normative model proposed in Pol. IV, 7, the second 
kind of aristocracy, i.e. the one consisting in well-tempered models, is 
certainly less desirable than a perfect aristocracy purely founded on 
absolute virtue, but this is not a good reason to dismiss the second kind as 
a possible guiding pattern for less perfect constitutions, especially for 
those who are far away from the ideal regime. An example of the latter 
kind of constitution might be represented by the third kind of aristocracy 
mentioned in Pol. IV, 7: a polity inclined towards oligarchy (Pol. IV, 
7.1293b18-21). It is not clear whether virtue is presupposed within the 
structure of the third aristocracy, as Aristotle rounds off the issue very 
quickly. Considering that in Pol. IV, 3 he has spoken of the generic 
tendency to mistake aristocracy for oligarchy, we might hypothesize that 
the latter kind of aristocracy be intended in the way in it is seen by 
common people29. In that case, it would not involve virtue and it might be 
regarded as diverging not only from the ideal aristocracy, but also and 
especially from the aristocracy based on a fine blend of qualities. 
Conceived as a deviation from the second kind of aristocracy outlined in 
Pol. IV,7, oligarchy might be very close – or even identical with - a polity 
which resorts to expedients designed to reduce the multitude’s political 
                                                 
28  See Pol. II, 11.1272b35-37. 
29  See SIMPSON 1998, 316-317. Cf. MULGAN 1977, 70. For a different view see Newman 
(1887-1902, 195-96), who conceives of this third kind of aristocracy as a true one for 
Aristotle. 
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weight30. Although this does not exclude the presence of virtuous people 
in the highest offices, considering that some respectable people descend 
by noble and rich families, virtue would not be publicly exhibited as a 
value of the constitution. 
Notably enough, Aristotle does not offer here historical examples to 
elucidate the third kind of aristocracy. This might be due to the fact that he 
has no interest in presenting it as a model to follow. If such a kind of 
aristocracy is a real deviation, it cannot be taken on as a valid, 
inspirational model of aristocratic constitution. Still, the former kinds of 
aristocracy will offer it some clues on how to modify its underpinnings in 
the direction of a virtuous blend of factors.  
 
4. A Fourth Kind of Aristocracy 
Having established some possible theoretical connections between 
sections 3 and 7 of Pol. IV, it is now time to answer our original question: 
do the three kinds of aristocracy discussed so far exhaust the whole issue 
about aristocracy? I suggest that a plausible answer can be given after 
consideration of Book IV, 11. Here, as I believe, Aristotle offers an 
outline of a form of aristocracy which does not match any of the typologies 
of constitution outlined so far: one fully identifiable with a polity primarily 
grounded on the power of the middle class. Another question then arises: 
if the constitution at stake is a true form of aristocracy, why should 
Aristotle accord it a separate treatment with respect to the others? 
In the first place, it should be noted that Aristotle’s discussion of a 
polity based on the rule of the middle class is introduced by Aristotle 
within a search on the kinds of constitution that meet specific 
requirements, namely those of political science. We have already seen 
how perfect aristocracy turns out to coincide with the ideal constitution in 
                                                 
30  On the expedients worked out against popular participation in some polities see Pol. IV, 
13.1297a15-35.  
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absolute. Among other things, this is precisely the first kind of 
constitution that a lawgiver endowed with political science should get to 
know, as we learn from Pol. IV, 1. As we have already seen, a lawgiver 
or politician endowed with political ἐπιστήμη will also know what 
constitution fits different kinds of city, that is, what is the best one in 
given conditions, but also the best under a given presupposition. At this 
stage of our discussion, however, I shall put these three requisites aside 
and concentrate on the fourth and last one: knowledge of the constitution 
which fits most states in general (Pol. IV, 1.1288b33-35). This is an 
activity of a substantial practical import, for such a knowledge should be 
possessed by the virtuous lawgiver committed to an extremely difficult 
task: that of amending and ameliorating the constitution in which he finds 
himself operating. The wise lawgiver ought to introduce an arrangement 
of such a sort that the ruled could easily accept it (Pol. IV, 1.1289a1-3). 
The prescriptive aspect of such a research stands out forcefully in its 
prominence. 
Only in the following section of the Politics we learn that the kind of 
constitution which Aristotle has in mind is one of aristocratic nature, that 
is, one in which the criterion of desirability is connected to the possibility 
of being applied to the majority of cities:   
 
We must distinguish, first, the number of varieties of regimes, if indeed there 
are several kinds both of democracy and of oligarchy; next, which is the most 
attainable and which the most choiceworthy after the best regime, and if there is 
some other that is aristocratic (εἴ τις ἄλλητετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ) and finely 
constituted (συνεστῶσα καλῶς) but fitting for most cities, which it is (Pol. IV, 
1.1289b11-17). 
 
The adjective συνεστῶσα is generally applied to indicate poetical 
compositions made by parts31; in association with the adverb καλῶς, it 
indicates a fine arrangement of elements, and conveys the idea of a 
                                                 
31  See the verb sunistanai at Poetics, 17.1455a22, 8.1451a29. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2016.2528
Elena Irrera  
 
Π Η Γ Η / F O N S   I  (2016), 98-122 115 
 
 
successful blending similar to the one emerging from the two patterns of 
well-temperate constitutions spelled out respectively in Pol. IV, 3 and 7. 
When the blended constitution is a non-aristocratic polity, that is, one 
grounded in a simple balance between the rich and the poor, a way to 
attain its distinctive balance is to impart order in such a way that the part 
of the city that wants that constitution is superior to the part that refuses it 
(Pol. IV, 12.1296b15-16) or, even better, in such a way that each social 
class is inclined to endorse the preservation of the constitution. A similar 
case occurs when one thinks that the constitution champions the same 
values by which one abides, i.e. those he identifies happiness with. In a 
well-organized polity each member believes to be well-represented, 
without seriously considering the possibility that people belonging to 
different social classes might fully accept the same constitution and 
perceive an equal sense of satisfaction32. 
Such a balance, though, proves extremely fragile and precarious, and 
just a few imperceptible moves would be sufficient to allow one part to 
acquire a position of political prominence. Not only in ill-balanced 
polities, but even in aristocratic constitutions do we find that revolutions 
do burst out because just a few people take part in political honours. As 
Aristotle explains, the starting point of a polity’s decline is the lack of a 
fine blending between democracy and oligarchy, whereas that of an 
aristocracy’s change for the worse is the lack of an appropriate mixture 
between the two above-mentioned elements and virtue (Pol. V, 7.1307a5-
11). Historically relevant examples of cases like this are Thurii and 
Locris, in which rebellions were undertaken by the δῆμος, as political 
offices and wealth were in the hands of just a few notables. Such things, 
                                                 
32  A clear example of a well-tempered constitution accepted by anyone is the one in which 
the polity which results from the mixture can be spoken of as either a democracy or an 
oligarchy (Pol. IV, 9.1294b14-17). Cf. IRRERA 2010, section III; WHIBLEY, 1968, 16-
17. 
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as Aristotle points out, would never have happened in a democracy and 
not even in a well-tempered aristocracy (ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμειγμένῃ) 
(Pol. V, 7.1307a27-40). 
What is then the connective element between rich and poor that has the 
power to guarantee a stable, and not simply temporary, fine blending? 
Aristotle proposes that it is the political role of the middle class. Such a 
constitution is the best not in absolute terms, but only in relation to a way 
of life which is possible for most to participate in. It is also meaningful 
that, in such a context of discussion, Aristotle introduces aristocracy as a 
benchmark for the understanding of the constitutional form under 
examination. Here, we read that there are various kinds of aristocracy, 
some of which fall outside the range of most cities, whereas others 
approach that form of government named “polity” (Pol. IV, 11.1295a31-
33). What is most relevant for our purposes is the remark at Pol. IV, 
11.1295a33-34: “hence we may speak of both as one”. Although far from 
the perfect city, there is still a sense in which the polity Aristotle is going 
to introduce can approximate the level of an imperfect aristocracy. 
In the impossibility to promote a form of government which endorses 
possession and exercise of perfect virtue for each and every citizen, it is 
still legitimate to maximize what constitutes the general character of 
ethical virtue, that is, its being an intermediacy between excess and 
deficiency. Such an intermediacy is not a political solution externally 
imposed to the city by lawgivers, namely the one consisting in the attempt 
to lead opposed classes to a mediation point, but it is one which must be 
interiorized by individuals, at least by those entrusted with political offices 
of high responsibility. A similar constitution is highly unlikely to be 
entirely formed by moderate citizens, even more so because, as Aristotle 
himself explains, there are three different classes of citizens: the extremely 
rich, the extremely poor and those who stand in-between them (Pol. IV, 
11.1295b1-3). The well-off and the poor will develop habits far from a 
healthy intermediacy just respectively in virtue of their excessive possess 
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or lack of material resources. As Aristotle however explains, since what is 
moderate is by general agreement the best, it is evident that even in the 
case of the goods of fortune a moderate possession will be the best, given 
that what is moderate is more well-inclined to obey reason, while for one 
who is exceedingly handsome, strong, well born or wealthy, or the 
reverse of these things, it is difficult to abide by the prescriptions issued by 
reason (Pol. IV, 11.1295b3-9). Despite its contingent character, an 
excessive or defective possession of goods, then, either material like 
wealth or immaterial like beauty, strength and nobility, exerts a profound 
and decisive influence on the shaping and the reinforcement of non-
virtuous ethical inclinations. More specifically, those in possession of an 
exceeding quantity of goods not only are not well-inclined to be subjected 
to the ruled, but are themselves unable to exert ruling power in the 
appropriate way. Those who live in conditions of extreme poverty, on the 
other hand, need the resources, strength and self-confidence required to 
engage in political deliberative process, which is why they appear more 
well-inclined to be ruled rather than to rule. Unlike the extremely rich and 
the extremely poor, whoever possesses a moderate quantity of resources is 
highly likely to obey and to exert reason more easily and appropriately 
(Pol. IV, 11.1295b9-1296a18). 
It is reasonable to suppose that, rather than presenting the picture of a 
state entirely constituted of citizens belonging to the middle-class, 
Aristotle is staging a normative model which makes use of the middle-
class as its pivotal underpinning. The political role of the middle class 
turns out to constitute a balancing power between opposite forces33, that 
                                                 
33  As the pivotal underpinning of a well-conducted political community, the middle class 
cannot emerge from a simple combination of the rich and the poor. See for instance 
FRANK 2005, 5, who explains that it rather emerges «when, on the basis of their self-
interests, the few and the many cooperate to their mutual advantage to produce a 
common good that is something more than a aggregation of their discrete self-interests». 
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is, as the ideal center of a symmetry which, without its presence, would 
degenerate and slide into political disorder and injustice. As Aristotle 
concludes,  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the political partnership that depends on the middling 
sort is best as well, and that those cities are capable of being well governed in 
which the middling element is numerous – most particularly if it is superior to 
both [of the other] parts, but if not, superior to either of them; for when added to 
one it will tip the scale and prevent the opposing excesses from arising (Pol. IV, 
11.1295b34-39). 
 
As a consequence, it is a truly good fortune for those who are engaged 
in politics to own a middling property, because where some possess too 
many things and others nothing, either an extreme democracy or an 
unmixed oligarchy are doomed to come into being. In the light of such 
possible outcomes, the middling sort of constitution will certainly appear 
the best, because it alone is without factional conflict. In fact, where the 
middling element is numerous, factional conflicts are less likely to occur 
(Pol. IV, 11.125b34-1296a2). 
A second aspect which positively affects the outcomes of political 
activity bears on the education endured by wise lawgivers. For it is 
generally to the middle class that belong lawgivers like Solon and 
Licurgus (Pol. IV, 11.1296a18-21). The lawgiver coming from the 
middle class must be aware of the stabilizing power of the intermediacy 
paradigmatically exemplified by his original social class, and must convert 
intermediacy itself into a source of virtuous political activity. This is why, 
as Aristotle points out at Pol. IV, 12.1296b34-38,  
 
The legislator should always add those of the middling sort [to the dominant 
class] in the regime. If he enacts oligarchic laws, he ought to aim at the middling 
sort; if democratic ones, he ought to attach these to them. 
                                                                                                                            
Cf. 163-178, where she contends that a middle class can emerge on through an already 
existing friendship within the polity. 
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His activity is the one proper to an arbitrator (ὁ διαιτητής) (Pol. IV, 
11.1297a5), that is, as the author of the fine blending which shapes such a 
constitution. His wise intervention, being firmly grounded in moderate 
attitudes, proves that the fine mixture is not a purely apparent harmony, 
but a stable, structural property of well governed cities, capable of sorting 
out beneficial effects both on political life itself an on the members of the 
community. The better the mixture in the polity, Aristotle says, the more 
lasting it will be. It is also indicative that  
 
Many of those who want to set up aristocratic regimes as well [as polities] 
thoroughly err not only by the fact that they distribute more to the well off, but 
also by deceiving the people. For in time from things falsely good there must 
result a true evil, and the aggrandizements of the wealthy are more ruinous to the 
polity than those of the people (Pol. IV, 13.1297a7-13). 
 
A good blending relying on the middle class might certainly be effected 
by some members of the middle class, but a simple good propensity to 
moderation is not sufficient. For, as Aristotle has already stressed in Book 
III, the good ruler should be equipped with φρόνησις. Such a virtue, 
being accompanied by the rest of ethical virtues34, will secure the right 
step in deliberative processes at the political level. It is just this virtue, 
presupposing a correct reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος), which causes lawgivers to 
think of the middle class as a potential counterbalancing power in the 
polity. Placing moderate individuals in strategic political offices will prove 
a successful strategy for both a good blending and its stability35. 
                                                 
34  On the connection between φρόνησις and the rest of ethical excellences see NE VI, 
13.1145a6-7. 
35  As Aristotle explains at Pol. V, 1.1302a13-15: «Moreover, the regime made up of the 
middling elements is closer to the [rule of] the people than to [rule of] the few, and this is 
the most stable of regimes of this sort».  
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Besides stressing an expediential aspect of the search for a good order 
and stability in the city, Aristotle’s argument on the well-ordered city 
invites us to believe that there is also an “aesthetical” reason in support of 
a fine blending of political components. As we have seen with respect to 
Pol. IV, 3, the mixture of parts in a well-tempered constitution is realized 
“in a beautiful way” (καλῶς), and so is a polity so well-organised that it 
can be called both a democracy and an oligarchy (Pol. IV, 9.1294b13-
17). This may allow us to view a hypothetically perfect polity, that is, one 
that can be regarded as a kind of aristocracy, in terms of a regulative 
ideal36 capable of inspiring virtuous lawgivers and politicians committed to 
political activity in deviant constitutions, especially when the well-
articulated blend on which it is based involves a substantial participation of 
people belonging to the middle class. 
This is why a polity which manages to satisfy both the need of beauty 
and that of stability can be identified as an aristocracy proper37. We can 
therefore speak of a fourth kind of aristocracy, that is, one which Aristotle 
is keen on keeping separate from the others in virtue of its peculiarly 
paradigmatic nature. As a constitution approachable by most 
communities, such a kind of aristocracy possesses a higher practical 
relevance than the ideal constitution itself, representing a pattern to be 
emulated by wise lawgivers.  
                                                 
36  This point is well emphasised by ROWE 2000, 367-368. With reference to Pol. IV, 1 
Rowe explains that Aristotle himself clearly says that «writing about the ‘best absolutely’ 
and saying what is ‘of practical use’ are not only compatible, but are actually both to be 
properly regarded as parts of the business of political philosophy’» (367).    
37  On the proximity of the polity to aristocracy see ROWE 2000, 380, 384. Cf. BLUHM 
1962. However, as Bluhm points out at 749, though the life of the polity is similar to  
that of the ideal state, Aristotle says that the polity falls short of the ideal (Pol. IV, 
11.1295a25–40). There are in fact some inequalities which are absent in the ideal state, 
such as the existence of wealthy and impoverished minorities. On this point see also 
JOHNSON 1988, 191.  
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